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RESPONSIBLE RESPONSE: Do THE EMERGENCY AND
MAJOR DISASTER EXCEPTIONS TO FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAws MAKE SENSE FROM A
RESTORATION AND MITIGATION PERSPECTIVE?
JULIA C. WEBB*
INTRODUCTION
Severe hurricanes are devastating events. They destroy homes,
streets, and playgrounds indiscriminately and can affect the lives of mil-
lions. When it is safe to return, residents typically want to restore things
to the way they were as quickly as possible. The removal of debris and
rebuilding efforts draw national attention, sympathy, and resources.
With all of the focus on human devastation, needs, and desires,
it is easy to forget that hurricanes are just as devastating to the coastal
environments they disrupt. After the people have evacuated, the dunes
and marshes remain to face the storm. In the rush to recover and re-
build, concern for the environment is not typically high on the federal
government's priority list.
This Note examines the attention paid by the federal government to
environmental issues when responding to large hurricane damage. Through
the exemption of disaster relief efforts from federal laws and regulations
designed to protect the environment, hurricane response often causes
further damage to environments already injured by the storms themselves.'
At least six, but perhaps more than a dozen, federal laws regulate
governmental actions towards the environment.2 Part I discusses the
portions of these statutes relevant to hurricane response and attempts
to piece together a view of what, if any, attention the government is re-
quired to pay to the environment during the disaster response process.
* Julia C. Webb is a 2007 J.D. Candidate at William & Mary School of Law. She received
an A.B. in Philosophy and Government, cum laude, from Dartmouth College in 2004. The
author would like to thank the Editorial Board and staff of the Review for their work in
preparing this Note for publication, and her family for their support throughout the process.
'See infra Part III.B.
2 THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AFTER DISASTER: AGENDA SETTING, PUBLIC POLICY, AND FOCUSING
EvENTs 50 (1997).
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Part II provides background information on an ecosystem that is
one of the most common victims of hurricane activity in the United States:
the Gulf Coast. An understanding of the general state of the environ-
ment in this area is crucial to assessing the impact caused by hurricane
landfall and disaster relief efforts. The Gulf Coast is home to a fragile,
yet extremely important, ecosystem, damage to which is detrimental to
the safety and economy of the communities that call it home. a
Part III profiles the federal response to Hurricane Katrina-a
Category 4 hurricane that hit the Gulf Coast in 2005-with a focus on
environmental impact and concern. From the examination of this event,
a picture of the weight actually given to environmental restoration (or
at the very least, the avoidance of further environmental harm) in the
course of disaster relief efforts can be assembled.
To understand the ideal amount of interaction between the federal
disaster response mechanisms and environmental concern, and where in
the process this interaction should take place, it is important to examine the
stages of disaster planning and response. Part IV examines these stages, as
well as some barriers to the implementation of effective mitigation measures.
Part V addresses whether the federal government should be paying
more attention to environmental damage caused by hurricanes, and to
the further impact that humanitarian relief efforts have on the environ-
ment. This Note concludes by discussing whether a more environmentally-
conscious hurricane response framework would be worth the resources
it would require, arguing that concern for the needs of human victims is
not incompatible with concern for environmental stewardship.
I. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS TRIGGERED BY HURRICANE
RESPONSE EFFORTS
Hurricanes, particularly severe hurricanes, cause a wide range
of environmental damage both directly and indirectly through a combi-
nation of strong winds, large waves, torrential rains, and flooding from
storm surges.4 Wetlands can be filled with surging floodwaters that may
contain significant chemical and solid waste.5 Rescue and rebuilding
'See infra Part II.
'National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Basics, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/englishl
basics.shtm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
' See generally National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Hazmat Challenges
From Hurricanes Bring Strong NOAA Response, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories
2005/s2517.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
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efforts may cause additional damage to wetland environments as they
take a back seat to restoring the human standard of living in the devas-
tated region. Thomas Birkland, the author of multiple scholarly works
on the natural disaster response policy, explains that:
Rather than a coherent national program to deal with hur-
ricanes, there are at least six federal statutes that indi-
rectly influence federal response towards hurricanes...
[N]one of these statutes address[es] the hurricane prob-
lem directly, but, rather, [they] touch on the problem as
part of broader issues such as flood control or barrier
island conservation.6
Without a unified approach to environmental issues that arise during
hurricane relief, a surprising number of statutes can theoretically apply
to post-disaster decisions. Some of the most important statutes that
must be considered include: the Coastal Zone Management Act;7 the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act;' the
Coastal Barrier Resources Act;9 the Clean Water Act;' ° the Clean Air
Act;" the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"); 12 the Endangered Species Act;' 3 and the
National Environmental Policy Act.' 4
6 BIRKLAND, supra note 2, at 50.
'Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-582, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-66 (2007)).
8 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288,
88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42. U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2007)).
' Coastal Barrier Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 97-348, 96 Stat. 1653 (1982) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-10 (2007)).
o Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2007)). This statute is commonly referred to as the
Clean Water Act.
" Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2007)). This statute is commonly referred to as the Clean Air Act.
12 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Pub. L. No.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2007)).
13 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2007)).
'" National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (2007)).
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Fortunately for lawyers and local governments, almost all of these
acts contain exemptions for emergency or major disaster situations."5
Partial suspension of requirements during emergencies can be found in:
the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; CERCLA; the Endangered Species
Act; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act; the Ocean
Dumping Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; the Wilder-
ness Act; and the Toxic Substances Control Act.16 The Clean Water Act,
CERCLA, the Oil Pollution Act, and the National Environmental Policy
Act contain more comprehensive "act of God" exemptions from liability
or other consequences for failing to comply with these laws.17 Congress
may also specifically exempt emergency or disaster response activities
from environmental laws at any time."s
To understand the effect of exempting emergency and major disaster
response efforts from federal environmental laws, it is helpful to examine
the operation of a few major laws under normal circumstances as a baseline.
A. Selected Examples of Federal Environmental Laws Under
Non-Emergency Circumstances
1. The Coastal Zone Management Act
The Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA")' 9 was passed in
1972 to create a national structure through which coastal zones could be
managed.20 Although it is a federal law, the CZMA is implemented almost
entirely by state and local governments.2" Under the CZMA, states de-
velop coastal management plans that must contain certain elements in
order to be approved by the federal government.22 Once a state's coastal
" Michael B. Gerrard, Disasters First: Rethinking Environmental Law After September 11,
9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 223, 230 (2003).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
9 Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-582, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-66 (2007)).20 MARK S. DENNISON, WETLAND MITIGATION: MITIGATION BANKING AND OTHER STRATEGIES
FOR DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLIANCE 46 (1997).
21 Id.
22 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2) requires that the state's management program must include each
of the following elements:
(A) An identification of the boundaries of the coastal zone subject to the
management program.
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management plan is approved, all federal activities affecting the coastal
management zone, as well as all private activities that require a federal
permit or license, must be consistent with the plan.23 Thus, a state can
identify large swaths of land as coastal zones under the CZMA. For
example, the entire state of Florida is considered a coastal zone under
that state's coastal management plan.24
2. The Clean Water Act
Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,25 common-
ly known as the Clean Water Act, to "restore and maintain the chemical,
(B) A definition of what shall constitute permissible land uses and water
uses within the coastal zone which have a direct and significant impact
on the coastal waters.
(C) An inventory and designation of areas of particular concern within
the coastal zone.
(D) An identification of the means by which the State proposes to exert
control over the land uses and water uses referred to in subparagraph
(B), including a list of relevant State constitutional provisions, laws, reg-
ulations, and judicial decisions.
(E) Broad guidelines on priorities of uses in particular areas, including
specifically those uses of lowest priority.
(F) A description of the organizational structure proposed to implement
such management program, including the responsibilities and inter-
relationships of local, areawide, State, regional, and interstate agencies
in the management process.
(G) A definition of the term "beach" and a planning process for the protec-
tion of, and access to, public beaches and other public coastal areas of envi-
ronmental, recreational, historical, esthetic, ecological, or cultural value.
(H) A planning process for energy facilities likely to be located in, or which
may significantly affect, the coastal zone, including a process for anticipat-
ing the management of the impacts resulting from such facilities.
(I) A planning process for assessing the effects of, and studying and
evaluating ways to control, or lessen the impact of, shoreline erosion,
and to restore areas adversely affected by such erosion.
16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2).
23 "Each Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or
water use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which is
consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved
State management programs." 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A). For additional requirements of
consistency with an approved state coastal management plan, see 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c).
24 DENNISON, supra note 20, at 47.
25Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2007)).
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."26 Among many
other provisions, the Clean Water Act requires that anyone who wishes
to discharge dredged or fill material into a waterway, including wetland
areas, must obtain a permit." The Army Corps of Engineers and the
Environmental Protection Agency jointly issue these permits.2" Though
the standard of what qualifies as a discharge of such materials had
traditionally been quite narrow, in 1990 the Army Corps of Engineers
indicated that all land-clearing activities using mechanized equipment and
certain projects placed on pilings would require a permit.29 Violations of
this provision of the Clean Water Act-either by failure to obtain a per-
mit or failure to comply with the terms of an issued permit-may be en-
forced by administrative compliance orders, civil enforcement proceedings,
or criminal enforcement actions as determined by the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers. °
3. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act,3 while not protecting wetland areas
directly, does protect them in their role as essential habitat for numerous
endangered species of animals.32 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is
the administrative agency that promulgates and administers regulations
made pursuant to the Act. It has defined the "harm" to species prohibited
by the Act as "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actu-
ally kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
26 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
27 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344; DENNISON, supra note 20, at 34 (discussing the process of deter-
mining whether or not a permit is required).
28 DENNISON, supra note 20, at 35.
29 Id. Before 1990, the EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the courts had all agreed
that the Clean Water Act regulations applied only to physical discharges of material into
navigable waters. Id. A 1990 Regulatory Guidance Letter issued by the Army Corps of
Engineers indicated their intent to expand its application as discussed. Id.
3 Id. at 36. Dennison goes on to discuss each of the three enforcement mechanisms in de-
tail, explaining the circumstances in which they are likely to be used. Id. at 36-38. The
most drastic consequence-that of a criminal enforcement action-is not just an idle threat.
The courts have issued convictions for knowingly filling wetlands without a Section 404
permit, the criminal penalty for which is imprisonment for not more than three years
and/or a fine of between $5,000 and $50,000 per violation. Id. at 38.
"' Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2007)).
32 See DENNISON, supra note 20, at 54-55.
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patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."33 The Fish and
Wildlife Service has also asserted in courts and other settings that
indirect effects that have the potential to cause future harm are within
the realm of the regulations.3 a In 1995, the Supreme Court held that this
was a reasonable interpretation of the Endangered Species Act.35
4. The National Environmental Policy Act
While many other federal environmental laws regulate the way
that public agencies and private entities interact with the environment
directly, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")36 takes an in-
direct approach.37 NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for all major projects that may
significantly affect the quality of the environment.3" "If it is not clear
whether a project would have significant impacts, an Environmental
Assessment (EA) must be prepared in order to make that determina-
tion."39 The public must be given the opportunity to participate in the
decision-making process, and the EIS must include a real analysis of al-
ternatives to the proposed action.4" The EIS is then forwarded to EPA,
which provides review and comments publicly.4' No agency has enforce-
ment authority over compliance with NEPA's requirements, however,
and critics cite as a major drawback the litigation generated when citi-
zens disapprove of allegedly non-compliant projects. 2 Regardless of en-
forcement difficulties, NEPA manages to take significant steps towards its
goal of convincing agencies to "incorporate consideration of environmental
impacts into decisions on permit applications and other discretionary
33 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2007). See also DENNISON, supra note 20, at 55.
34 DENNISON, supra note 20, at 55.
35 Id. at 55-56. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,
515 U.S. 687 (1995).
36 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (2007)).37 See DENNISON, supra note 20, at 45.
38 LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL33104, NEPA AND HURRICANE
RESPONSE 1 (2005), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Mar/RL33104
.pdf. For the specific language requiring that an Environmental Impact Statement be
prepared, see 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2007).
39 LUTHER, supra note 38, at 1.
40 DENNISON, supra note 20, at 46.
41 LUTHER, supra note 38, at 2 n.5.42 Id. at2.
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actions taken by ... agencies."' Though agencies are not required to select
the option that is best for the environment," the process of preparing the
EIS may help to identify previously unseen alternatives. In addition, the
NEPA process gives the public the opportunity to vocalize any objections
they may have to the environmental consequences of the project.45
B. Select Exemptions from Environmental Regulations for
Emergency or Natural Disaster Situations
The federal environmental laws mentioned above, as well as
many others, attempt to prevent the environment from being damaged
in situations where there are strong competing interests. Emergency and
natural disaster conditions create precisely that dilemma. In emergency
situations, however, public policy has traditionally required that short-
term concerns trump these longer-range environmental goals.46 This pub-
lic policy is implemented through a variety of methods: 1)the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ("Stafford Act")
exempts a variety of federal actions taken in response to a disaster from
compliance with NEPA;4 v 2) the Council on Environmental Quality, which
is charged with "providing oversight and guidance to [federal] agencies
with regard to EIS preparation," may provide "emergency alternative
arrangements" for meeting NEPA requirements without the preparation
and filing of a full Environmental Impact Statement; 48 3) individual
environmental statutes may contain regulation-specific emergency or
disaster exemptions;49 and 4) Congress may pass additional legislation
exempting specific federal actions from a specific range of federal environ-
mental regulations in response to a particular emergency or disaster."
43 DENNISON, supra note 20, at 46.
4 LUTHER, supra note 38, at 2.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No.
93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-207 (2007)) (demon-
strating that in disaster and emergency situations, at a minimum the listed federal actions
are considered more important than evaluating environmental affects according to NEPA).
47 42 U.S.C. § 5159. See infra Part I.B.1.
4 LUTHER, supra note 38, at 2 n.5, 4. See infra Part I.B.2.
'9 See infra Part I.B.3.
50 The fourth and final approach, that of passing disaster-specific legislation that exempts
certain actions from applicable environmental regulations, is discussed in Part III as it
relates to legislation introduced after Hurricane Katrina. Since each piece of legislation
varies substantially, it is not particularly productive to address as a general approach here.
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1. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act
The Stafford Act 5' exempts many federal actions taken in response
to declared disasters or emergencies from the responsibility to comply
with NEPA requirements.52 Some response actions that are explicitly
excluded from NEPA by the Stafford Act's "[p] rotection of environment"
provision include:
* The provision of certain federal resources or assist-
ance essential to meeting immediate threats to life
and property resulting from a major disaster....
* The repair, restoration, and replacement of public
facilities or certain non-profit facilities, damaged
or destroyed by a major disaster....
0 Debris removal from public or private land after a
major disaster.5 3
NEPA's role in encouraging federal agencies to examine the consequences
of their actions on the environment is therefore significantly disabled
during natural disasters and declared emergencies.
5' 42 U.S.C. § 5121.
52 The specific statutory language states:
An action which is taken or assistance which is provided pursuant to
section 5170a, 5170b, 5172, 5173, or 5192 of this title, including such
assistance provided pursuant to the procedures provided for in section
5189 of this title, which has the effect of restoring a facility substan-
tially to its condition prior to the disaster or emergency, shall not be
deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (83 Stat. 852) [42 U.S.C.A. 4321 et. seq.]. Nothing in
this section shall alter or affect the applicability of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 to other Federal Actions taken under this
chapter or under any other provisions of law.
42 U.S.C. § 5159. See also LUTHER, supra note 38, at 1.
' LUTHER, supra note 38, at 3. The "[pirotection of environment" provision of the Stafford
Act, found at 42 U.S.C. § 5159, refers to exempted activities by the number of the code
section that discusses them: 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)-(b) address the provision of federal re-
sources or assistance essential to meeting immediate threats to life and property; 42 U.S.C.
§ 5172 discusses actions regarding public facilities; 42 U.S.C. § 5173 focuses on debris
removal. For the purposes of this Note, it is less important to discuss specific exemptions
than it is to understand that a substantial number of federal actions taken in response
to disasters are exempted from NEPA's requirements for consideration of the environ-
mental impacts of those actions.
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2. "Emergency Alternative Arrangements" Provided by the
Council on Environmental Quality
In emergency situations, NEPA allows agencies to communicate
with the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") about alternative
ways to comply with NEPA requirements:
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take
an action with significant environmental impact without
observing the provisions of these regulations, the Federal
agency taking the action should consult with the Council
about alternative arrangements. Agencies and the Council
will limit such arrangements to actions necessary to con-
trol the immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions
remain subject to NEPA review. 4
It appears that the CEQ may choose to allow agency activities immedi-
ately related to emergency disaster assistance even when those activities
don't fall under Stafford Act exemptions to make alternative arrange-
ments. This creates an even broader range of actions that may be exempt.
The CEQ's ability to create alternative arrangements during emergen-
cies, when viewed alongside the Stafford Act, demonstrates that NEPA
and its objectives are to be given only a passing glance during federal
disaster relief and portions of the recovery and restoration process.
3. Emergency Exceptions to Applicability Within Statutes
In addition to laws that override environmental regulations in emer-
gency or disaster situations, such as the Stafford Act, specific environmental
statutes may contain their own special procedures for these situations.
One example is the Endangered Species Act, which substantially eases
the process involved in requesting an exemption for Presidentially-declared
disaster areas."
In the absence of a disaster situation, the Secretary of the Interior,
before forwarding an exemption request to the Endangered Species
Committee ("Committee") for final consideration, determines whether
the federal agency attempted to develop and consider alternatives, con-
ducted any required biological assessments, and refrained from making
40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2007).
55 16 U.S.C. § 153 6 (p) (2007).
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any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of agency resources to the
project.5" The Committee then grants an exemption only if they find that:
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
agency action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits
of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving
the species or its critical habitat, and such action is in the
public interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and
(iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor the exemp-
tion applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable com-
mitment of resources.57
The Committee is authorized to establish any mitigation or enhancement
measures necessary to minimize the adverse effects of the agency actions.8
During natural disasters, the Endangered Species Act provides
the President authority to grant exemptions to federal agencies concern-
ing actions in any area that he has declared a "major disaster area." "
The ability of Federal agencies to appeal to the President for a quick
decision in major disaster areas allows them to avoid a significantly in-
volved process, though the same requirements appear to apply.
As the preceding examples in this Part illustrate, while the United
States has made great strides in adopting legislation designed to protect
the environment, the wide-sweeping exemptions for emergency and di-
saster situations undermine these efforts.
56Id. § 1536(g).
57 Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A).
58 Id. § 1536(h)(1)(B).
5 The specific statutory language states:
In any area which has been declared by the President to be a major di-
saster area under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, the
President is authorized to make the determinations required by sub-
sections (g) and (h) of this section for any project for the repair or replace-
ment of a public facility substantially as it existed prior to the disaster
under section 405 or 406 of the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assis-
tance Act, and which the President determines (1) is necessary to prevent
the recurrence of such a natural disaster and to reduce the potential
loss of human life, and (2) to involve an emergency situation which does
not allow the ordinary procedures of this section to be followed.
Id. § 1536(p).
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO A COMMON COASTAL VICTIM:
THE GULF COAST
The Louisiana coast is home to one quarter of the nation's wet-
lands and forty percent of the lower forty-eight states' salt marshes.6" It
is also home to eighty percent of the country's annual wetlands losses.6'
Over thousands of years, the Mississippi River has created roughly five
million acres of marsh and swamp in its search for the best path to the
Gulf.62 In the last century, over a million of those acres of swamp have
disappeared.63 Estimates place wetland loss anywhere from 16,000 acres
to 35,000 square miles per year.' This means that Louisiana is losing a
mass of wetlands the size of a football field every fifteen minutes, or one
the size of Manhattan every year.6"
While wetland loss in Louisiana is of obvious concern to the local
residents, it has significant consequences for the rest of the country that
are largely ignored. Roughly thirty percent of the nation's seafood catch
(excluding Alaska) comes from Louisiana, as does twenty-five percent of
the oyster harvest each year.66
Furthermore, without coastal Louisiana's contributions to energy
production, this country would be in dire straights. Twenty percent of the
nation's oil and a quarter of its natural gas either comes from or travels
across the state's wetlands.67 Louisiana waters account for a massive
eighty percent of the country's offshore oil and gas production.68 A gauge
located in a pipeline in the small town of Erath, Louisiana-located only
eight miles from the receding coastline-determines the price of natural
gas on the New York Mercantile Exchange.69
In addition to providing exceptional food and energy resources to
the entire country, Louisiana's extensive wetlands help to mitigate the
60 CHRISTOPHER HALLOWELL, HOLDING BACKTHE SEA: THE STRUGGLE ON THE GULF COAST
TO SAVE AMERICA 11 (2001).
61 Id.
62 Id.
6 Id.
6 Id.
65 Id. Other sources characterize the loss slightly differently. See, e.g., BILL STREEVER,
SAVING LOUISIANA? THE BATTLE FOR COASTAL WETLANDS 22 (2001) ("An area the size of
Rhode Island has disappeared since the 1930s.").
66 HALLOWEL, supra note 60, at 12.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 13.
69/d.
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potentially devastating effects of hurricanes.7 ° By absorbing wind-driven
high waters, coastal wetlands can decrease a storm's surge by one foot for
every 2.7 miles of wetlands.7 Wetlands loss also decreases the quality of
drinking water in coastal Louisiana as saltwater creeps further and fur-
ther up the Mississippi River, destroying productive freshwater marshes
along the way.72 Animal populations, including twenty percent of North
America's shrimp population, experience drastic fluctuations as their
environments either change or disappear.73
So why, after thousands of years of wetland creation, are the
Louisiana wetlands disappearing? The Mississippi river naturally changes
course over time in its search for the easiest and fastest route out to the
Gulf.74 Humans have improved upon natural levees by building large con-
crete structures that constrain the mighty river to its present course and
prevent it from straying as it has done in the past.75 While keeping the
water out of inhabited areas on the other side of the levees is beneficial
for human development, the levees cause land that used to get its nutri-
ents from periodic flooding to starve.76
Canals dredged for the convenience of oil and gas industries also dis-
rupt natural drainage patterns and flood fragile marshes, causing them
to lose their soil.77 A study by the United States Geologic Survey indicated
70 See Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and
Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3, 75-76 (1983); see also IVOR VAN HEERDEN & MIKE BRYAN,
THE STORM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY DURING HURRICANE KATRINA-THE INSIDE
STORY FROM ONE LOUISIANA SCIENTIST 153 (2006). Heerden and Bryan put this point in
very clear terms: "The wetlands are absolutely vital for protecting this whole part of the
state [of Louisiana] from any hurricane's storm surge. Along with the barrier islands, they
are the best, most natural, least expensive buffer available." Id.
71 HALLOWELL, supra note 60, at 13.72 Id. at 17.
73Id. at 18. In fact, "Louisiana's richest seafood crops-menhaden, shrimp, and oysters-
are completely dependent upon the coastal marshes for their existence." Houck, supra
note 70, at 84.
7 STREEVEp, supra note 65, at 9.
75 HALLOWELL, supra note 60, at 16.
76 See Houck, supra note 70, at 22-23. "Historic natural riverine processes of overbank
flooding, crevassing, and upstream diversion were responsible for extensive sedimen-
tation and deltaic plain progradation. Virtual elimination of these processes, coupled with
extensive canalization and hydrocarbon extraction, has led to the serious land loss problem
we now face." Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).77 Id. at 24. See also MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 85 (2006) ("Oil and gas activities, plus the federal government's
attempts to control the Mississippi River for navigation and flood control, contribute sig-
nificantly to massive coastal erosion."); STREEVER, supra note 65, at 19 (mentioning an
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that thirty-six percent of wetlands loss in Southern Louisiana between
1932 and 1990 can be directly attributed to exploration, drilling, and
transportation. 78 An additional twenty-one percent of wetlands loss
during that period is due to "altered hydrology," or the containment of
the natural patterns of the Mississippi river.7 9
With the alarmingly fast loss of Louisiana's coastal wetlands, indi-
vidual residents and corporate citizens alike began to recognize that a
severe hurricane could devastate the region as never before without the
natural buffer of the marshes. "In February 2000, State Farm Insurance,
which carries one-third of the state's homeowner policies, announced a
severe curtailment on the writing of new policies in coastal Louisiana
because the potential for massive hurricane damage [was] becoming too
great." ° Christopher Hallowell, in his 2001 book Holding Back the Sea,
ominously predicted that:
Storms now have leeway to topple oil rigs, destroy the
20,000-mile-plus maze of pipelines that zigzag across the
coast carrying gas and crude oil to refineries, to wash out
roads and railroads, and to fill the basin that the city of
New Orleans occupies, drowning its citizens, its history,
and eclectic cultural melange in a horrific inundation of
mud-fortified water.8 '
Against this eerily accurate academic background, Hurricane Katrina's
devastation simply cannot be said to have come as a surprise to anyone
versed in coastal wetlands loss. Coastal Louisiana's 2.8 million people,
ninety percent of whom live less than three feet above sea level, know now
more than ever how important and valuable the gulf coast wetlands are
to the very development that destroys them.s
alternative theory that "wetland loss is not from sediment starvation and subsidence, not
from controlling the Mississippi River, but from extensive coastal zone canal
construction, mostly for support of the oil and gas industry"). For a more in-depth treat-
ment of this topic, see Houck, supra note 70, at 33-44.
78 HALLOWELL, supra note 60, at 17.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 18.81 Id. at 19.
82 Louisiana is a particularly salient example of the value of wetlands. Bill Good of the
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources has said:
We're under more pressure than they are in other states .... We've got
more at stake. The Delta is dying. People are affected directly. They can
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III. FEDERAL HURRICANE RESPONSE IN ACTION:
HURRICANE KATRINA
A. The Impact of Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina hit the gulf coast on August 29, 2005.3 The
hurricane swept in with 140 mile-per-hour winds and twenty to thirty
foot storm surges on the coast.8 4 When it hit the city of New Orleans, the
wind was still blowing over 100 miles per hour. 5 The levees that protect
the city could not hold the water back, and entire neighborhoods were
underwater.8 Many areas received more than ten inches of rain from
Katrina. 7 "At least 80 percent of the City of New Orleans was at some
point underwater, though the flooding ranged from as little as one or two
feet in areas such as the French Quarter to over 20 feet in the Lower
Ninth Ward." 8 Six states-Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia,
Florida, and Tennessee-experienced direct damage from the storm. 9
Even after the storm had passed through, a delayed federal re-
sponse left thousands of people without adequate food, water, and sani-
tary systems for several days.9" The floodwaters quickly became toxic, as
storm-damaged pipelines spilled oil which mixed with sewage and other
toxic materials.9' While the human cost is difficult to quantify, Hurricane
Katrina necessitated, without a doubt, "one of the largest natural disaster
relief and recovery operations in United States history."92 This is true even
see the changes in their own lifetimes .... What's happening here in
Louisiana is a good case study linking the environment and economy.
What happens here underscores what will happen anywhere the environ-
ment is ignored.
Streever, supra note 65, at 173 (quoting Bill Good, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources).
' National Climate Data Center, Summary of Hurricane Katrina, http://www.ncdc.noaa
.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
84 id.
8 51 d. The House report on the Gulf Coast Recovery Act of 2005 lists similar wind speed
statistics. H.R. REP. No. 109-364, at 1 (2005).
8" National Climate Data Center, supra note 83.
87 H.R. REP. No. 109-364, at 1.
"" Id. at 2.
89 Id.
" Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2005, at 1; Keith O'Brien & Bryan Bender, Chronology of Errors: How a Disaster
Spread, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2005, at Al.
91 Lipton et al., supra note 90; O'Brien and Bender, supra note 90.
92Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery Activities: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
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in the midst of severe criticism from across the nation that the govern-
ment was late to react and has not done enough to assist the victims.
93
In the days after Katrina hit, it quickly became apparent that nu-
merous significant environmental health and safety issues would need
to be addressed immediately. Dr. Julie Louise Gerberding, Director of the
Centers for Disease Control Prevention, formed a joint taskforce to assess
the environmental health needs in New Orleans.14 This taskforce con-
cluded that, among other potential environmental health concerns, New
Orleans also had significant problems with drinking water, waste manage-
ment, disposal of debris, soil contamination, standing flood waters, rodent
control, and food safety. 5
In order to drain New Orleans, contaminated floodwaters were
pumped back into Lake Pontchartrain.96 These floodwaters contained "a
mix of raw sewage, bacteria, heavy metals, pesticides and toxic chem-
icals, among other things."9" High levels of fecal bacteria were found in
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Norman J.
Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accoun-
tability Office) [hereinafter Statement of Norman J. Rabkin], available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d051053t.pdf.
" See Lipton et al., supra note 90; O'Brien and Bender, supra note 90.
94 ENVTL. HEALTH NEEDS & HABITABILITY ASSESSMENT JOINT TASKFORCE, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HURRICANE KATRINA
RESPONSE: INITIALASSESSMENT iii (2005) [hereinafter INITIALASSESSMENT], available at
http://www.epa.gov/katrina/reports/envneeds habassessment.pdf.
9 Id. at 7. The joint taskforce recognized in the report that "[the most striking feature
of the disaster is the array of key environmental health and infrastructure factors affected
all at once." Id. at 24.96 HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 70, at 188-89. Heerden & Bryan describe the decision
to pump the "water" into Lake Pontchartrain as follows:
Another question was whether this water-this toxic stuff-should be
pumped directly into Lake Pontchartrain, from which it could spread
into the marshes and swamps, or into the Mississippi River, thence into
the Gulf of Mexico? The question was asked, but only two of the pumps
for New Orleans discharge into the river. The priority had to be getting
the water out of the city, no matter where it ended up or how toxic it
turned out to be. The water would go into the lake.
Id.
97 PERVAZE A. SHEIKH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL33117, THE IMPACT OF
HURRICANE KATRINA ON BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 6 (2005), available at http://ncseonline
.org/nle/crsreports/06Mar/RL33117.pdf. Despite the concession of many agencies and
individuals, reflected in the works cited in this Part, that the storm surge was highly
contaminated and dangerous, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, wrote in a report to President Bush that "[tihe storm's collective environ-
mental damage, while not creating the 'toxic soup' portrayed in the media, nonetheless
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the water flooding New Orleans, and testing of sediments demonstrated
contamination both with bacteria and fuel oils.9" "As the flood water re-
cedes, and the toxic-laden sediment and residue dries, a fine dust begins to
swirl with wind or disturbance. This fine, toxic dust presents a serious risk
to citizens if inhaled.9 9 It is too early to tell what the impact of these con-
taminants will be on Lake Pontchartrain's ecosystem, but it is difficult to
see how plants and fish living in or alongside the lake would not be affected.
The amount and variety of hazardous debris left behind when the
floodwaters were cleared present additional environmental challenges.
In a hearing before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, an
attorney from the National Resources Defense Council explained that:
[A]n estimated 100 million cubic yards of debris have been
generated by Katrina-enough to cover over 1,000 football
fields 50-feet-deep with waste. This far exceeds the waste
generated by any previous hurricane, and dwarfs the 1.5
million tons of debris from the World Trade Center attacks
on 9/11. While some of this debris is merely downed trees
or vegetation, much of it is destroyed housing, commercial
buildings, 350,000 ruined vehicles, and a wide array of
other detritus, much of which has been soaked by petro-
leum or other toxic chemicals, and much of which is inter-
mixed with plastics and other materials that will become
toxic if burned. 1°'
In nearby Baton Rouge, contaminants considered "likely to be found" in the
storm waters included "tens of millions of pounds of concrete, lumber, cars,
animal carcasses and all the other solid waste of a major metropolitan
did create a potentially hazardous environment for emergency responders and the general
public." FRANCES FRAGOs TOWNSEND, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND
SEcuRrrY AND COUNTERTERRORISM, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA:
LESSONS LEARNED 61 (2006).
98 ROBERT ESWORTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL33115, CLEANUP
AFrERHURRICANE KATRINA: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS 14-17 (2005), available at
http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/05oct/RL33115.pdf.
9 Hurricane Katrina: Assessing the Present Environmental Status: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Environment and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Erik D. Olson, Senior Attorney, National
Resources Defense Council) [hereinafter Statement of Erik D. Olson], available at http://
www.nrdc.org/legislation/katrina/0509291a.pdf.
100 Id. at 6.
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area."'' An estimated 350,000 cars were trapped by the storm and
subjected to extensive flooding.° 2 The amount of gasoline and other toxic
fluids in these cars added significantly to the contamination of the water
and surrounding debris.'1 3
Hurricane Katrina hit areas containing Superfund hazardous
waste sites. 10 4 575 spills of oil or other hazardous chemicals have been
reported as a result of Katrina, releasing more than seven million gal-
lons of oil alone. °5 Concerns about air pollution and air quality also arose
from these releases.
10 6
The impact of the hurricane disrupted the economy of the gulf
coast as well as its environment.107 Ports hit by Katrina "accounted for
4.5 percent the total exports of goods from the United States last year,
and 5.4 percent of total U.S. imports."' Commercial fishing in the areas
hit by Hurricane Katrina produces ten percent of the shrimp and forty
percent of the oysters sold in the United States.19 The region hit by the
storm contained "15 major fishing ports, 177 seafood processing facili-
ties, 1,816 federally permitted fishing vessels, and more than 13,000 state-
permitted fishing vessels." 110 The hurricane and the resulting flooding
caused structural damage to many fishing industry buildings, machines,
and vessels, in addition to the damage done to the harvestable supply
and workforce displacement."' "Initial losses to seafood production from
Katrina were estimated at $1.1 billion for Louisiana and may exceed
$200 million for Alabama, exclusive of infrastructure; Mississippi losses
are comparable to those of Alabama."" 2 Oyster beds were "extensively
101 Timothy Dwyer et al., Katrina Takes Environmental Toll, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2005,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2005/09/06/AR2005
090600498.html.
102 Statement of Erik D. Olson, supra note 99, at 2.
103 Id.
" Id. ("Impacts to fisheries, timberland, agricultural, and recreational sites contain not
only environmental costs, but a significant economic cost as well.").
105 Id.
106 Id. at 3.
107 SHEIKH, supra note 97, at 1.
108 Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, supra note 92, at 2.
09 EUGENE H. BUCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RS22241, HURRiCANES KATRINA
AND RITA: FISHING AND AQUACULTURE INDUSTRIES-DAMAGE AND RECOVERY 1 (2005),
available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22241.pdf.
110 Id.
SId. at 3.
112 Id. at 1. A partial breakdown of these numbers can be gleaned from the Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, who have estimated the twelve-month potential
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damaged, if not totally destroyed, by siltation and contamination related
to Katrina.""' The joint taskforce composed of the Center for Disease
Control and the Environmental Protection Agency issued a report only two
weeks after the hurricane which recognized that there would be a need
to assess the "safety of fish and shellfish [for consumption] as a result of
unwatering into Lake Pontchartrain and associated water systems."1
In addition to the human and economic costs, Hurricane Katrina
caused substantial damage to the gulf coast environment. Erik Olson, a
Senior Attorney for the National Resources Defense Council, claimed that
"Katrina is perhaps the single worst environmental catastrophe ever to
befall the United States as a result of a natural disaster.""' For example,
"Katrina went through several areas of shallow-shelf estuarine waters
including extensive oyster reefs, large marine and estuarine submerged
aquatic vegetation beds, and wetlands.""' Salt water, brought in by the
storm surge or contained in the floodwaters, found its way into sensitive
and ecologically important freshwater ecosystems, substantially altering
the habitat for a number of species of birds, fish, and shrimp." 7 Hurri-
cane Katrina damaged sixteen federal wildlife refuges, totalling 365,000
acres." ' The storm altered the habitats of at least three endangered or
threatened species." 9
The hurricane also changed the size and shape of several barrier
islands. 2 ° These islands not only served as important habitat for local
wildlife, but they also formed natural buffers to hurricanes and storm
surges.' 2 ' Hurricanes Katrina and Rita converted over seventy square
miles of marsh into open water, 122 exacerbating the already-extensive
problem of wetland loss in the area.123
losses at dockside as follows: "crab (12.3 million), menhaden ($44.6 million), other salt-
water fish ($11.8 million), and freshwater fish ($190,000)."Id. at 3. Twelve-month potential
production losses at the retail level were also calculated: "crab ($82 million), menhaden
($93 million), other saltwater fish ($79 million), and freshwater fish ($1.3 million)." Id.
113 Id. at 2.
114 INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 94, at 15.
11' Statement of Erik D. Olson, supra note 99, at 1.
116 SHEIKH, supra note 97, at 1.
117 Statement of Erik D. Olson, supra note 99, at 7.
118 SHEIKH, supra note 97, at 3.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 3 (noting that before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, only about 15,000 acres of
wetlands per year were being converted to open water).
123 See supra Part II.
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The relief, recovery, and restoration efforts begun after Hurricane
Katrina made landfall have created some continuing environmental con-
cerns. One example is toxic underwater sediment:
[One major source of toxins that has received very little
public attention to date is the toxic sediment that has accu-
mulated at the bottom of many of the lakes, rivers, and
streams in industrialized areas over many decades due to
industrial spills. These toxic underwater hotspots have long
been of concern to state and federal officials. According to
experts with whom we have spoken in Louisiana, many of
these toxic hotspots have now been stirred up, and toxic
sediment has been re-suspended, and re-deposited across
large land areas, including in residential communities, by
storm surge and floodwater. 1
24
Disposal of the large amount of debris created by the storm also creates
an ongoing concern about the protection of the environment. 125 The con-
taminated waste will need to be taken to landfills or possibly burned.126
The composition of the debris causes concerns about the effect of even
contained burning on air quality in the area. 127 "The unique issues asso-
ciated with the volume and diversity of debris and waste may lead to
innovative/creative approaches for disposing of these materials."'28
B. Federal Agency Response to Hurricane Katrina and the Use of
Disaster Exemptions From Environmental Regulations
In responding to Hurricane Katrina, the federal government uti-
lized several of the emergency and disaster exemptions from environ-
mental regulations. The Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") announced its
recognition of the emergency consultation provisions for requesting ex-
emptions from the Endangered Species Act.'29 "Specifically, the FWS
states that the restoration of 'any infrastructure damaged or lost due to
124 Statement of Erik D. Olson, supra note 99, at 3.
125 ESWORTHY, supra note 98, summary.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 SHEIKH, supra note 97, at 4.
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the hurricane back into the original footprint does not require ESA con-
sultation with the Service." 3 °
The Army Corps of Engineers, the agency responsible for several
disaster relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities, invoked its emer-
gency procedures only five days after the hurricane hit the gulf coast.'13
These procedures require district commanders to consider only the "prob-
able environmental consequences" of their emergency actions and to com-
municate with CEQ about NEPA arrangements. 132 Actions defined as
emergency actions for the purpose of the provision include "Flood Control
and Coastal Emergencies Activities. . . and projects constructed under
sections [sic] 3 of the River and Harbor Act of 1945 or 14 of the Flood
Control Act of 1946 of the Continuing Authorities Program."13 3 Actions
taken in response to Hurricane Katrina clearly fell within this scope. Sev-
eral of the emergency actions taken by the Army Corps of Engineers, such
as shoring up the levees to prevent further breaches, would also be auto-
matically exempt from NEPA requirements under the Stafford Act.13 4
The Army Corps of Engineers has drawn criticism by planning to rebuild
130 Id. (citations omitted).
131 JAMES E. MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE
RL33107, EMERGENCY WAIVER OF EPA REGULATIONS: AUTHORITIES AND LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS IN THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE KATRINA 4 (2005), available at http:/!
ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/06Mar/RL33107.pdf.
132 33 C.F.R. § 230.8 (2007). This provision is found in Part 230, which covers "Procedures
for Implementing NEPA." Section 230.8 is entitled "Emergency Actions," and provides that:
In responding to emergency situations to prevent or reduce imminent
risk of life, health, property, or severe economic losses, district command-
ers may proceed without the specific documentation and procedural
requirements or other sections of this regulation. District commanders
shall consider the probable environmental consequences in determin-
ing appropriate emergency actions and when requesting approval to
proceed on emergency actions, will describe proposed NEPA documenta-
tion or reasons for exclusion from documentation. NEPA documentation
should be accomplished prior to initiation of emergency work if time
constraints render this practicable. Such documentation may also be
accomplished after the completion of emergency work, if appropriate....
When possible, emergency actions considered major in scope with poten-
tially significant environmental impacts shall be referred through the
division commanders to HQUSACE (CECW-RE) for consultation with
CEQ about NEPA arrangements.
Id.
133 Id.
"
4 See supra Part I.B.1.
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the levees to the same specifications as before Hurricane Katrina.135 While
recognizing that several of these levees were completely leveled by the
storm, "[tihe Corps for its part says that it does not have the funding to
do it better."136
On September 8,2005, CEQ put out a memo regarding"emergency
alternative arrangements" for compliance with NEPA.131 In this memo,
CEQ explained that any federal agency taking an action with significant
environmental impacts should consult with CEQ, which would then develop
emergency alternative arrangements for compliance with NEPA based
on the specific facts and circumstances of the situation.131 The memo also
lists several factors to be addressed during the consultation with CEQ." 9
Once an agency and CEQ come to an agreement about emergency alter-
native arrangements for compliance with NEPA, CEQ will put the ar-
rangements and the facts on which they are based in writing.4 ° Courts
have not reversed emergency alternative arrangements, though they are
subject to judicial review.'
CEQ has issued the Federal Emergency Management Agency
("FEMA"), the primary player in federal disaster relief, recovery, and re-
construction operations, an individualized set of NEPA policies and pro-
cedures.' These procedures contain guidance for FEMA officials about
135 CNN REPORTS, KATRINA: STATE OF EMERGENCY 171 (2005).
136 Id.
137 Memorandum from Horst G. Greczmiel, Council on Envtl. Quality, Emergency Actions
and NEPA (Sept. 8,2005), available at httpJ/ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/EmergencyActions
andNEPAMemo forFederalNEPAContacts.pdf.
138 Id.
'
39 Id. These factors include:
[The] nature and scope of the emergency; actions necessary to control
the immediate impacts of the emergency; potential adverse effects of
the proposed action; components of the NEPA process that can be fol-
lowed and provide value to decisionmaking (e.g. coordination with af-
fected agencies and the public); duration of the emergency; and potential
mitigation measures.
Id.
140 Id.
14 Id. ("Courts afford CEQ substantial deference regarding its determination of emergency
alternative arrangements. Alternative arrangements have been unsuccessfully challenged
three times.").
142 44 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-.14 (2007). The policy goals stated in the procedures begin with the
general statement that:
FEMA shall act with care to assure that, in carrying out its responsi-
bilities, including disaster planning, response and recovery and hazard
mitigation and flood insurance, it does so in a manner consistent with
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when an EIS is and is not required, as well as a list of more than twenty
categories for which it is assumed that no EIS needs to be prepared.
1 3
Actions of an emergency nature are still statutorily excluded by the Staf-
ford Act, but many FEMA actions may fall outside of those exclusions."
If the action falls into a categorical exclusion listed in the CEQ procedures,
the agency will not have to prepare an EIS unless "extraordinary circum-
stances" are present.'45 However, "[i]f extraordinary circumstances exist
within an area affected by an action, such that an action that is categori-
cally excluded from NEPA compliance may have a significant adverse en-
vironmental impact, an environmental assessment shall be prepared."'46
These circumstances include:
(i) Greater scope or size than normally experienced for a
particular category or action;
(iii) Potential for degradation, even though slight, of al-
ready existing poor environmental conditions;
(v) Presence of endangered or threatened species or their
critical habitat...
(vii) Actions with the potential to affect special status areas
adversely or other critical resources such as wetlands,
coastal zones, wildlife refuge and wilderness areas; [and]
(viii) Potential for adverse effects on health or safety.'47
FEMA has at its disposal several methods of avoiding compliance with
environmental regulations in connection with its disaster response efforts
to choose from, including both the blanket Stafford Act exemptions and
tailored CEQ procedures that accommodate the emergency nature of much
of their work.
national environmental policies. Care shall be taken to assure, consistent
with other considerations of national policy, that all practical means and
measures are used to protect, restore, and enhance the quality of the en-
vironment, to avoid or minimize adverse environmental consequences ....
Id. § 10.4.
143 Id. § 10.8(d).
14 See supra Part I.B.1.
145 44 C.F.R. § 10.8(d)(3).
1
4 6 Id.
14 7 Id.
2007] 551
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLeY REV.
Unlike the Army Corps of Engineers or FEMA, who follow regu-
lations administered by other agencies, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") enforces several federal laws." After Hurricane Katrina,
however, the EPA "temporarily waived regulations regarding gasoline and
diesel fuel in all 50 states."149 This development is perhaps more frighten-
ing to those concerned with environmental integrity in the face of natural
disasters than the breadth of exemptions to environmental regulations.
Agencies responding to Hurricane Katrina must also deal with
state environmental regulations. Many of these regulations have pro-
visions exempting actions taken in response to emergencies or disasters
similar to those discussed above," ° and therefore have not required agen-
cies to focus on the environment to a greater extent than required by
federal regulations.
For example, the State of Louisiana Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality Emergency Declaration provides that
owners and operators of solid waste management facilities
that had permits from the Department before the hurricane
"are authorized to make all necessary repairs to restore es-
sential services and the functionality of stormwater man-
agement and leachate collection systems damaged by the
Hurricane, without prior notice to the Department." The
order provides that vegetative debris and construction and
demolition debris mixed with other hurricane-generated
debris need not be segregated prior to disposal.'
This order also gives local governments the authority to burn vegetative
debris without prior notice, and waives requirements relating to the
cleanup of asbestos materials.152 As state officials begin to relax or waive
air pollution requirements in order to permit the burning of toxic debris,
concern for the public and environmental health has increased.153
In their efforts to respond to Hurricane Katrina, agencies have
taken advantage of emergency and disaster exemptions from both state
'" Environmental Protection Agency, About EPA: What We Do, http://www.epa.gov
epahome/aboutepa.htm#whatwedo (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
149 MCCARTHY & COPELAND, supra note 131, at 6.
"0 Id. at 5.
151 Id. (citations omitted).
152 Id.
13 See, e.g., Statement of Erik D. Olson, supra note 99, at 7.
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and federal environmental regulations. "In the short term,... it would
not appear that environmental regulations have posed an obstacle to
local, state, federal, or private response efforts. As a result, the question
of whether additional waiver authority is needed would appear to be best
addressed in the context of longer term recovery efforts." 54
C. Federal Legislative Proposals to Expand Exemptions From
Environmental Regulations for Hurricane Response Purposes
Following Hurricane Katrina, four bills were introduced in Congress
that would have created additional exemptions from environmental regu-
lations for response to that particular disaster.155 Three Senate bills-two
of which were identical-and one House bill were proposed shortly after
the disaster hit the gulf coast.
S. 1711156 would have allowed the Environmental Protection
Agency to "waive or modify the application of any requirement that is
contained in any law" under EPA's administrative jurisdiction, if it "is
necessary to respond, in a timely and effective manner, to a situation or
damage relating to Hurricane Katrina."1"7
Four days after S. 1711 was introduced, Senators Vitter and
Landrieu, both of Louisiana, introduced identical bills in the Senate.' 5
While aimed at increasing disaster relief and recovery funds, the bills
would also give the President the power to issue emergency permits.5 9
The bills would authorize the President to issue a permit for "any project
carried out in response to, or as a part of a reconstruction effort relating
to, Hurricane Katrina or a related condition, as the President determines
to be in the best interests of the United States." 6 ° In addition to giving
this waiver power to the President, the bills would have established a com-
mission to develop a work plan for ensuring economic and social recovery
"4 MCCARTHY & COPELAND, supra note 131, at 8.
.
55 Id. at summary.
16 S. 1711, 109th Cong. (2005). S. 1711 was sponsored by SenatorJames Inhofe, Chairman
of the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee, and Senator David Vitter of
Louisiana on September 16, 2005, only eighteen days after Hurricane Katrina made land-
fall. See id.; see also MCCARTHY & COPELAND, supra note 131, at summary.
5. 1711 (emphasis added).
158 Both bills are entitled "Louisiana Katrina Reconstruction Act." S. 1765, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 1766, 109th Cong. (2005).
1'9 See S. 1765; S. 1766.
160S . 1765 § 502(a)(1); S. 1766 § 502(a)(1).
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in the region.'6 ' Any projects undertaken by this commission in accordance
with this work plan would automatically be deemed to comply with NEPA.
16 2
In addition to S. 1711, S. 1765, and S. 1766, a House bill proposed
in response to Katrina would have allowed for extensive variations in envi-
ronmental regulations in certain specific instances.'63 Also known as the
Fuel Supply Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 3836 would have required
authorities to approve applications for permits to reconstruct refineries
within ninety days."M The law would have applied to permits issued under
a wide variety of environmental regulations, including the Clean Air Act,
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act,
CERCLA, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the Toxic Substances Control
Act, and NEPA.'65
A report on all four legislative proposals prepared by the Congres-
sional Research Service on September 29, 2005, was skeptical of the need
for such broad grants of exemptions and waiver.'6 6
[Tihe report raises questions concerning the waiver au-
thority that new legislation might grant, including what
its scope (both geographic and regulatory) would be, how
facilities granted waivers would be regulated after the ex-
piration of the waiver period, the effect of such legislation
on state and local requirements, and whether substantive
as well as procedural requirements should be waived, if
waivers are to be granted.'67
Though the Senators and Representatives sponsoring these bills may have
intended only to eliminate some red tape and expedite the recovery and
reconstruction process, the legislation could have created major loopholes
in environmental regulation in the affected regions. At least one environ-
mentalist went even further, accusing the sponsors of these bills of an
additional motivation altogether:
161 The commission would have been called the "Protecting Essential Louisiana Infra-
structure, Citizens, and Nature Commission," or the "Pelican Commission." S. 1765 § 501;
S. 1766 § 501. See also LUTHER, supra note 38, at 7-8.
162 S. 1765 § 501; S. 1766 § 501. See also LUTHER, supra note 38, at 7-8.
163 See McCARTHY & COPELAND, supra note 131, at summary; see also LUTHER, supra note
38, at 9.
164 H.R. 3836, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2005). See also LUTHER, supra note 38, at 9.
165 H.R. 3836 § 3(c). See also LUTHER, supra note 38, at 9.
166 See McCARTHY & COPELAND, supra note 131.
"' Id. summary.
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Lobbyists and their congressional allies are already lining
up hoping to undercut long-standing health and environ-
mental safeguards in the name of hurricane recovery. In
a few select cases, it may make sense to make temporary
accommodations in federal health and environmental rules
to address legitimate needs. But nearly all of these can be
accommodated without changes in current law, much less
the blanket suspension legal safeguard being proposed by
special interests. 6 '
None of these four bills made it out of committee, though similar bills
could very well be proposed in the wake of future disasters. The per-
ception that the continued protection and restoration of the environment
should be of secondary importance to the restoration of man-made struc-
tures after major natural disasters, though politically popular, only in-
creases human vulnerability to future storms.
IV. THE DISASTER CYCLE: PREPAREDNESS, MITIGATION,
AND RESPONSE
"Natural disaster" may be a misnomer since people are re-
sponsible for the increased problems as they make their
environment more prone to disasters and themselves more
vulnerable to those hazards. After a flood, for example,
people almost invariably move back into hazard zones,
and sometimes in greater numbers.'69
168 Statement of Erik D. Olson, supra note 99, at 10.
169 Beverly A. Cigler, Current Policy Issues in Mitigation, in MANAGING DISASTER: STRAT-
EGIES AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 39, 40-41 (Louise K Comfort ed., 1988). A similar argu-
ment is made by Charles Meade and Megan Abbott:
[Miany have claimed that the desires and habits of Americans are
largely responsible for the rising economic losses. Specifically, population
migration to high-risk areas-seismically active regions, remote areas
susceptible to wildfires, coastlines-has increased steadily in recent
years. More than 50 percent of U.S. citizens now live in coastal areas,
where they are vulnerable to flooding and hurricanes .... As populations
increase in an area, so do[es] the clearing of forests for new homes and
businesses, the destruction of wetlands, and the paving of roads and
parking lots, all of which increase the runoff from heavy rainfall, putting
lives and property at risk.
CHARLES MEADE & MEGAN ABBOTT, ASSESSING FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
FOR HAZARD Loss REDUCTION 4 (2003) (citation omitted), available at http://www.rand
.org/pubs/monograph reports/2005/MR1734.pdf.
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Disaster-prone areas may be particularly attractive for residen-
tial and economic development.7 v This is certainly true of coastal areas
that are often hit.by hurricanes.'' However, there are many ways in
which authorities can address the likelihood of disasters before any par-
ticular disaster occurs.
The federal government's involvement in natural disasters such as
hurricanes can be separated into three stages: preparedness, mitigation,
and response. v2 The steps taken in a given geographic area during each
of these stages greatly influence the work required in the others. 7 3 Pre-
paredness and mitigation efforts are an indispensable part of any effort to
decrease the amount of response, recovery, and reconstruction necessary
after a given disaster because they help to reduce the amount of damage
done. 7 4 "[Mitigation and preparedness are central to an effective disaster
170 See Leonard I. Ruchelman, Natural Hazard Mitigation and Development: An Exploration
of the Roles of the Public and Private Sectors, in MANAGING DISASTER: STRATEGIES AND
POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 169, at 53,62 ("A study sponsored by the United States
Department of the Interior of some 300 barrier islands off the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts
found that, despite warnings, at least half of the seventeen or more federal agencies that
have jurisdiction have actually encouraged development on these islands. The develop-
ment, in turn, has made the islands more hazardous places in which to live.").
171 Id.
172 Seegenerally MARY COMERIO, DISASTER HITS HOME: NEW POLICY FOR URBAN HOUSING
RECOVERY (1998); PETER MAY & WALTER WILLIAMS, DISASTER POLICY IMPLEMENTATION:
MANAGING PROGRAMS UNDER SHARED GOVERNANCE (1986).
'
73 See generally COMERIO supra note 172; MAY & WILLIAMS, supra note 172.
174 See MAY& WILLIAMS, supra note 172. May and Williams provide a brief summary of
the interaction between disaster preparedness, disaster mitigation, and disaster response:
For many years, federal policymakers have sought ways to limit both
disaster losses and federal disaster relief costs. Historically, the main
federal policy approach has been to try to control flood hazards through
the building of dams, levees, and other structures. More recently, the em-
phasis has been upon greater preparedness for responding to disasters
and upon averting disaster losses through land use regulations, appro-
priate construction practices, and other efforts to limit development in
hazardous areas.
In principle, the recent efforts to control the growth of federal
disaster relief outlays and to control the longer-run growth of disaster
losses make eminent sense. By increasing preparedness capacities, gov-
ernmental entities are better situated to issue warnings or respond in
a fashion that helps minimize disaster losses. Through land use revi-
sions and other hazardous development modifications-called in gen-
eral nonstructural mitigation efforts---disaster losses can be averted. In
practice, however, disaster preparedness and mitigation raise two basic
dilemmas for federal disaster policy. First, there is a political dilemma
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policy that can prevent and lessen loss rather than simply respond when
disasters strike."75 In responding to disasters and leading disaster re-
covery efforts, the federal government should incorporate mitigation plan-
ning to the greatest degree possible in order to offset the ways in which
it encourages development in disaster-prone areas. 76
A. Preparedness
The term "preparedness" refers to actions taken in advance of a di-
saster that increase readiness to deal with disasters when they do occur.
177
Though it is important to recognize how preparedness influences the way
that federal agencies respond to natural disasters, preparedness will not
receive extensive coverage in this Note. For the purposes of evaluating
the intelligence of exemptions from environmental regulations in disaster
situations, it is enough to point out that the degree to which an agency
is prepared to evaluate and include environmental effects in its disaster
response choices will greatly influence its ability to avoid causing further
damage to the environment.
B. Mitigation
According to FEMA, hazard mitigation is any "sustained action taken
to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to life and property from a hazard
event.", ' Both structural and non-structural measures are often involved in
mitigation strategies. 179 Structural measures commonly employed include
coming from the disjunctive nature of federal disaster policymaking.
Second, there is an implementation dilemma arising from the shared
governance of disaster policy among different layers of government.
Id. at 2. These two dilemmas are addressed infra Part IV.D.
175 MAY & WILLIAMS, supra note 172, at 1. See also COMIERO, supra note 172, at 27 (explain-
ing that a "good disaster recovery program starts with a serious commitment to reducing
future damage through preparedness and mitigation").116 See infra Part IV.D.
177 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, ARE YOU READY? AN IN-DEPTH GUIDE TO CITIZEN
PREPAREDNESS 7 (2004), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/areyouready/areyouready
_full.pdf.
118 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Hazard Mitigation Planning, http://www
.fema.gov/plan/mitplanning/index.shtm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
19 Cigler, supra note 169, at 41.
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dams,' levees, 8' sea walls,"S2 seismic retrofitting, 8 3 and reinforcing high-
way bridges.'" In addition to their relatively high cost, "levees, seawalls,
diversions, and other structural measures... can disrupt or destroy the
natural environment. Structural projects may also create a false sense of
security, increasing the amount of property at risk of flooding as people
and businesses locate behind levees and flood walls."18' Nonstructural
measures include a wide range of creative efforts to reduce disaster dam-
age such as "land use regulations, zoning laws, building codes, economic
programs (such as tax and insurance incentives)," 86 "[w]arning and evac-
uation planning,"'87 "[p]roperty acquisition,""M "[plublic information,"89 and
even conservation of wetlands and the prevention of coastal dune ero-
sion. 9 ° While structural measures are designed to mitigate the damage a
disaster causes once it hits an area, nonstructural mitigation measures
are "designed to keep vulnerable structures and activities out of the most
hazard-prone areas or to minimize the likelihood of structural damage."' 9 '
Though "[plostdisaster actions such as rebuilding damaged struc-
tures in hazard-resistant ways or relocating structures and people are also
mitigation strategies due to their concerns with the long-term reduction
180 id.
181 Id.
182 id.
183 MEADE & ABBOTT, supra note 169, at 6-7.
184 Id.
1'- DAVID A. GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION: RECASTING DISASTER
POLICY AND PLANNING 31 (1999) (citation omitted).
181 See Cigler, supra note 169, at 41.
187 RUTHERFORD H. PLATr, DISASTERS AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF EXTREME
NATURAL EVENTS 70 (1999).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 See GODSCHALK, supra note 185, at 499. While protection of the natural environment
is itself of value to many people, it also plays a valuable role in protecting people and
property from severe storm damage:
[Pirotection of the environment is often the most effective strategy for
mitigating natural hazards. Conservation of wetlands, for instance, can
serve as an effective and economical flood control strategy; coastal dune
systems act as natural seawalls. Protection of natural values in water-
sheds is a preventative, cost-effective strategy for flood mitigation.
Id. See also PLATr, supra note 187, at 70; Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, supra note 92,
at 6-7 (recognizing that '[tihe condition of environmental resources has an important role
in both the prevention ... [of and] recovery from natural disasters").
"'1 Cigler, supra note 169, at 41.
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of the effects of hazards,"'19 2 plans for post-disaster recovery and recon-
struction are not the same as mitigation plans. 9 ' While both are for-
ward-looking, "[tihe primary purpose of mitigation planning is to identify
community policies, actions, and tools for implementation over the long
term that will result in a reduction in risk and potential for future losses
communitywide."194
In 1995, FEMA revealed a National Mitigation Strategy.195 Though
an important step in the Federal government's recognition of the value of
mitigation efforts, the National Mitigation Strategy has met with sig-
nificant criticism. 9 ' Several years later, Congress passed the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000, which created the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program.'97 The program was intended:
(1) to reduce the loss of life and property, human suffering,
economic disruption, and disaster assistance costs result-
ing from natural disasters; and
(2) to provide a source of predisaster hazard mitigation
funding that will assist States and local governments (in-
cluding Indian tribes) in implementing effective hazard
mitigation measures that are designed to ensure the con-
tinued functionality of critical services and facilities after
a natural disaster. 9 8
192 Id.
193See JIM SCHWAB ETAL., PLANNING FOR POST-DISASTER RECOVERYAND RECONSTRUCTION
15 (1998).
194 Id.
195 MEADE & ABBOT, supra note 169, at 6.
196 See, e.g., GODSCHALK, supra note 185, at 58. David Godschalk has explained that:
The National Mitigation Strategy is a major accomplishment and a
watershed document in the history of U.S. mitigation policy. However,
many of its goals and objectives are broad, subject to substantial inter-
pretation ('adopt incentives ... promote awareness'), and not overly
ambitious. The vision presented is neither clear nor compelling. Since
the plan's completion, it is not clear that many of the shorter-term objec-
tives have been accomplished. Nevertheless, it is the first attempt at
the federal level to think strategically about mitigation and begin to put
forth a systematic agenda for advancing mitigation in the United States.
Id.
197 Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552 (2000).
198 Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 § 101(b), 114 Stat. at 1553. For more information on
FEMA's role in the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, see 44 C.F.R. §§ 201.3-201.5 (2007).
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Despite the explicit recognition of the impact that mitigation can have on
disaster damage and recovery costs, Congress cut the budget for the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program in half in 2003.1' Only after the tragedy of Hur-
ricane Katrina did Congress act to return funding to its previous level. °°
Despite the efforts that have been made to incorporate hazard miti-
gation strategies into the federal disaster response system, many critics
see more talk than action.201 A recent federal study found that research on
mitigation strategies is vastly underfunded, and that "R&D focused on long-
term loss reduction strategies could improve the resilience of commu-
nities and infrastructure, protecting life and property in a far more sub-
stantial way."2 2 This is an effect unique to mitigation; neither preparedness
or response efforts can accomplish similar results.20 3 Other critics have
voiced similar concerns, pointing out that "[a]fter three decades of the
National Flood Insurance Program, two decades since the formation of
FEMA and over one decade since the Stafford Act, there has been no
systematic effort to evaluate the effectiveness of various approaches to
flood hazard mitigation, let alone mitigation of other natural risks."2 °4 In
addition to their skepticism over the effectiveness of the few mitigation
measures that have been implemented, critics are also concerned that
proven mitigation measures have not yet found a place in federal policies.2 °5
"' Reducing Hurricane and Flood Risks in the Nation: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm.
on Water Resources and Environment of the H. Comm. on Transportation and Infra-
structure, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Rod Emmer, Association of State Floodplain
Managers Member and Executive Director, Louisiana Floodplain Management Association)
[hereinafter Statement of Rod Emmer], available at http'//www.house.gov/transportation/
water/10-20-05/emmer.pdf.
200 Gulf Coast Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 4438, 109th Cong. (2005). The House Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure recommended that the Bill pass in a report filed
on Dec. 22, 2005. H.R. REP. No. 109-364 (2005). However, no action was taken after the
Committee's report.
201 See GODSCHALK, supra note 185, at 58; MEADE & ABBOTT, supra note 169, at xiii;
PLATT, supra note 187, at 71.
202 MEADE & ABBOTT, supra note 169, at xiii.
20 See generally id.
2"4 PLATT, supra note 187, at 71. Platt continues by arguing that the failure to evaluate
the effectiveness of mitigation approaches is most likely due to the failure to concretely
define what is meant by"mitigation." Id. "The federal government, and particularly FEMA,
are [sic] still struggling to define, achieve, evaluate, and improve their efforts in hazard
mitigation. Despite abundant rhetoric, it remains unclear what mitigation really means,
and who should pay for it." Id.
205 Id. Platt quotes a 1994 report by the Natural Academy of Sciences, which complained
that "[m]itigation has been an underlying requirement of federal emergency management
policy for about 30 years, beginning with floodplain management requirements in the
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Rutherford Platt offers the following explanation for these failures to
take mitigation seriously:
Mitigation has had a checkered history over the past
three decades. While universally supported in principle,
it has often proven to be the unwelcome guest at the post-
disaster banquet. Rebuilding more safely may cost more,
take longer, and sometimes conflicts with private property
interests and public tax base and economic priorities. And
despite recent expansion of funding for mitigation, the
lion's share of federal disaster assistance is still devoted
to rebuilding the status quo ante, as quickly as possible."'
Thus, while mitigation has been recognized as an important part of the
puzzle of reducing the costs of natural disasters, it has not yet been imple-
mented in such a way that it can make a significant impact.2"7 Political
problems, discussed later in this Part, may be the single largest barrier
to wide-ranging implementation of mitigation strategies.2 8
C. Response, Recovery, and Reconstruction
In the first two weeks after a disaster, thousands of deci-
sions are made by exhausted volunteers and government
workers under pressure to do all they can. At the same
time, thousands of promises are made by politicians in
front of TV cameras. Victims who have lost everything, and
victims who have lost a few of grandma's dishes, all expect
to be made whole .... 2 09
Disaster situations do not start off organized. It is the role of the
federal government to come into these often chaotic situations and decide
who gets what type of help and when that help will come.210 Understand-
ably, the initial focus is on the inhabitants' physical health and safety,
1960s. In actual practice, however, only a fraction of the mitigation measures known to
be effective have been implemented." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).206 Id. at 71.
207 See generally id.; MEADE & ABBOTT, supra note 169.
208 See infra Part IV.D.
209 COMERIO, supra note 172, at 19.
210 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121, 5170a, 5170b, 5172 (2007).
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as well as their ability to be economically self-sufficient. It is against this
backdrop that decisions about what and how to rebuild are made. These
early decisions, however, "can foreclose many opportunities to reshape
the patterns of development in a community so as to make it better and
safer by reducing vulnerability to future disasters," creating "a cycle of
damage and repair."211
Federal agencies that are involved in dispersing funds for recon-
struction after a disaster must consider alternatives to simply rebuilding
to the pre-existing specifications. A handbook for urban planning profes-
sionals aimed at planning for post-disaster recovery explains that "[t]he
plan for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction should have, as part of
its policy objectives concerning economic recovery, not just the objective
of restoring normal economic activity but that of making it more re-
sistant to such disruptions should nature strike again."212 Much of the
time, it is possible to implement simple requirements for reconstruction,
such as tougher building codes that incorporate proven mitigation tech-
niques." 3 At times, however, these easier mitigation efforts, such as tougher
211 SCHWAB, supra note 193, at 7. Michael Eric Dyson offers San Francisco's response to
the earthquake and fire in 1906 as an example of this cycle of disaster and repair:
[11n their rush to quickly rebuild San Francisco, city leaders gave
in to the wishes of a well-financed and well-insured private business
community, which sparked the city's quick recovery from disaster.
The business community ignored redevelopment plans that took
into account the city's precarious site. Instead, they followed the original
patterns of streets and land use.... San Francisco chose to "build at
a rate and manner which made the city not only less beautiful than
was possible, but more dangerous."... In 1989, their words rang true:
San Francisco's Marina District, resting on the rubble from 1906, was
severely damaged in the Loma Prieta earthquake.
DYSON, supra note 77, at 38-39.
212 SCHWAB, supra note 193, at 55. The handbook explains:
In essence, this means seizing the opportunity, where it is deemed appro-
priate, to move the community's most vital businesses out ofharm's way.
In other cases, such as waterfront or water-related activities that must
remain along the coast or shoreline or in a floodplain, the objective may
instead be to make them less vulnerable to damage through floodproof-
ing, elevation, or other structural mitigation approaches.
The most dramatic examples of building a disaster-resistant econ-
omy have come from small towns that have either completely relocated
or at least moved their central business district[s] from the path of di-
saster. Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, set a notable example by relocating
its entire downtown away from the Kickapoo River floodplain in the early
1980s, thus forever eliminating what had been a repetitive problem.
Id. (citation omitted)
213 Id.
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building codes, may not be enough to solve the problem.214 More drastic
approaches, such as the re-zoning of the land or, in extreme cases, the relo-
cation of entire towns may be appropriate.215 Though this sounds severe,
it may make significantly more sense in the longer term.
Many property owners are facing the need to rebuild or to
repair damaged buildings, and while this circumstance gen-
erally leads to pressure to allow them to rebuild the same
structures in the same places, this need not always be the
outcome--certainly not where the local government is pre-
pared with some alternatives and has identified in advance
some resources with which to implement them.216
By refusing to re-create a recently destroyed status quo, the federal govern-
ment could prevent the continuation of a cycle of disaster and help to dras-
tically reduce the costs required in subsequent response and recovery efforts.
D. Political Problems
[Tihe politically most popular policy-expanding federal
disaster relief assistance-is both costly and does little to
control longer-run growth of disaster losses. On the other
hand, the policies which are believed to be the most ef-
fective in these latter respects-preparedness and miti-
gation- are politically less salient and therefore unlikely
to receive much attention during the active stages of fed-
eral disaster policymaking.2 7
Despite their obvious connection to the reduction of future disaster
costs, mitigation programs encounter problems of politics when attempt-
ing to secure funding.21 In addition, disaster relief assistance and other
federal government programs encourage just the type of development in
coastal areas that mitigation efforts would attempt to discourage if they
were appropriately funded.219 These political problems present obstacles
214 See id.
215 See id. (citing Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, as an example).
216 Id. at 62-63.
217 MAY & WILLIAMS, supra note 172, at 3.
218 See id. See also GODSCHALK, supra note 185; PLAIT, supra note 187.
219 See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
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to the successful operation of mitigation programs that could otherwise
save the federal government and taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars over the long-term.
Supporting providing communities hit with disasters with suffi-
cient funding to restore them to their previous conditions is politically
popular. 22' However, supporting additional building code requirements
that would require homeowners (who are also voters) to put additional
funds into their homes that they may not recognize as necessary, or to
support land use regulations that could appear similarly frivolous is not
politically popular.22' In particular, "[tihe property rights movement and
the takings issue. . . have diminished the ability or will of federal, state,
and local officials to utilize land use regulations."222
The federal government also encounters problems of state and local
politics when attempting to implement its mitigation programs.223 The
priorities of state and federal government actors are not always aligned:
On the one hand, federal officials have a strong stake in
promoting hazard mitigation and preparedness but little
direct control over the effectiveness of such efforts. On the
other hand, in the aggregate, subnational governments and
individuals owning property in hazardous areas directly
control the effectiveness of mitigation and preparedness
policies, but for the most part actions consistent with such
policies are low on their list of priorities.224
Due to the inability of the federal government to directly change local build-
ing codes or land use regulations, some have suggested that the federal gov-
ernment condition disaster assistance on a community's implementation of
220 See MAY & WILLIAMS, supra note 172, at 3-5.
221 Id.
222 PLATT, supra note 187, at 295. The Constitution requires that the government com-
pensate landowners if a land use regulations strips their property of all of its economic
value. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
While the Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council has not spawned an outpouring of anti-regulatory decisions in
the lower federal or state courts, the threat of Lucas-based lawsuits has
caused public agencies at all levels of government to refrain from restrict-
ing property rights, even in the face of well-documented natural hazards.
PLATr, supra note 187, at 295 (citation omitted).
223 See MAY & WILLIAMS, supra note 172, at 5; PLATT, supra note 187, at 200.
224 MAY & WILLIAMS, supra note 172, at 5.
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mitigation programs.225 While states with a mitigation plan can receive
an increased federal contribution for any mitigation measures taken dir-
ectly following a declared disaster, in reality this bar has been set quite
low. 226 State and local governments, however, are unlikely to change
building codes and land use regulations themselves, as they often con-
flict with economic development goals.227 Thus far, as one critic so simply
explains, "FEMA has not had the visibility, leadership or political clout
to bring about the integration of programs or of the investments in mit-
igation and preparedness."221
The federal government itself also encourages development in
hazard-prone areas through comprehensive disaster assistance pro-
grams.229 Examples of federal programs that encourage development in
areas where mitigation would otherwise discourage it include disaster
assistance funds,3 ° subsidized flood insurance under the National Flood
Insurance Program,2"' and tax benefits for disaster losses such as the ca-
sualty loss deduction under the tax code. 2 These federal programs are
225 See PLATT, supra note 187, at 297-98. Platt explains:
State and localities have legal authority to guide development away from
the most hazardous locations and areas of repetitious damage. The
federal government lacks this authority. It is therefore incumbent on
the nonfederal members of the "partnership" to do their part in reducing
future losses to their citizens, to their own jurisdictions, and to the
nation. If they fail to act prudently in their development decisions,
their eligibility for flood insurance and public assistance (PA) under
the Stafford Act should be suspended, or provided under less favorable
financial terms, such as at a higher premium level or nonfederal cost-
share requirement.
Id.
226 42 U.S.C. § 5165(a) (2007). The only guidelines for the state mitigation plan require
the state to:
(1) identify the natural hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities of areas
in the state;
(2) support development of local mitigation plans;
(3) provide for technical assistance to local and tribal governments
for mitigation planning; and
(4) identify and prioritize mitigation actions that the State will
support, as resources become available.
Id. § 5165(c).
227 See COMERIO, supra note 172, at 200.
22 8 PLATr, supra note 187, at 88 (quoting a 1993 National Academy for Public Adminis-
tration report entitled "Coping with Catastrophe").
229 See generally GODSCHALK, supra note 185, at 35; PLATT, supra note 187, at 291-93.
230 PLAT, supra note 187, at 293.
231 GODSCHALK, supra note 185, at 35.
232 id.
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so comprehensive that "[a]ifter Topsail Island, North Carolina, was devas-
tated by hurricanes Bertha and Fran in the summer of 1996, none of the
beachfront communities that share the island had to raise taxes to pay for
repair costs."233 Though a few innovative programs attempt to avoid this
problem,234 a definitive solution has yet to be implemented nationwide.235
The federal government's role in encouraging development, coupled
with the political unpopularity of mitigation measures and the federal
government's current inability to force their adoption by state and local
governments, causes proven mitigation measures to be passed up in favor
of a more costly and more dangerous disaster response and recovery pol-
icy. "The basic challenge for reform is to convert the original Stafford Act
approach from a disaster-driven system to a policy- and threat-driven
system so that it becomes proactive rather than reactive."236
233 PLATrT, supra note 187, at 293.
234 The Coastal Barrier Resources Act ("CoBRA") is perhaps the best example. Enacted in
1982, it removes federal subsidies for development that takes place on designated un-
developed barrier island units. Coastal Barrier Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 97-348, 96
Stat. 1653 (1982) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-10 (2007)).
The area covered by the act was substantially expanded under the
Coastal Barrier Improvement Act of 1990 and now includes some 600
barrier island units and 1,200 miles of shoreline. Several national
studies have attempted to examine its effectiveness at discouraging
barrier island development, and considerable debate has occurred about
the actual effects of CoBRA. Although CoBRA has slowed development
in some coastal areas, economic pressures often overcome the with-
drawal of these public subsidies.
GODSCHALK, supra note 185, at 35 (citation omitted).
131 Some critics, such as Mary Comerio, have proposed a drastic reduction in the disaster
recovery and reconstruction funds provided by the federal government as a solution to
their inability to control the mitigation policies of state and local governments as well
as individual property owners. COMERIO, supra note 172, at 26.
One approach to disaster recovery would be to simply let the marketplace
sort out the winners and losers after a disaster, focusing government
and charitable aid only on the emergency period. Individuals would then
make decisions to stay in or leave an area, to rebuild housing or not,
based on their jobs and personal financial circumstances. After a disas-
ter, a region might grow with new investment or shrink if people and
businesses decided to relocate rather than rebuild. In this circumstance,
a government might decide to intervene in financing rebuilding efforts
or not, depending on the impacts to particular market sectors or the eco-
nomic significance of the region... If such hard-hearted market-driven
models are unacceptable in a society, then private and public disaster
recovery requires a reliable source of capital to finance building repairs.
Id.
236 GODSCHALK, supra note 185, at 528.
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V. Is THERE A BETTER WAY?
One month after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Erik Olson,
a senior attorney with the National Resources Defense Council, was
asked to speak before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce's
Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials about the envi-
ronmental effects of Hurricane Katrina. After commenting extensively
on the possible health effects of the damage to the environment, Mr. Olson
explained that "waivers of environmental laws would kick hurricane vic-
tims while they are down."23" Referring specifically to federal response
and recovery actions following Hurricane Katrina, Mr. Olson warned of
the consequences of these waivers or exemptions: 'Throughout this effort,
cleanup standards and other health safeguards must be kept strong, to
assure that people made vulnerable by the storm are not further threat-
ened by inadequate cleanups or irresponsible reconstruction practices. 239
Mr. Olson's statement shows that it is concern for the future of human
residents, not just concern for the state of the environment for its own
sake, that has motivated many scholars to question the current federal
approach to environmental regulation in the post-disaster context.
After Hurricane Katrina hit the gulf coast in August of 2005,
Audwin M. Samuel, Mayorpro tem of Beaumont, Texas, testified before
the House Committee on Homeland Security that "[t]he highest priority
of all levels of government in addressing disaster and terrorism issues
should be prevention and mitigation. Mitigation saves lives and reduces
injuries; reduces economic losses; maintains and protects critical infra-
structure; and reduces the liability borne by local governments and
elected officials."24 ° Yet, a report requested by President Bush entitled
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned mentions
hazard mitigation only a handful of times in several hundred pages.241
The same report devotes substantial attention to recommendations for
improving the preparedness of the nation's disaster response system, but
237 Statement of Erik D. Olson, supra note 99, at 2.
238 Id. at 7.
239Id.
240 Federalism and Disaster Response: Examining the Roles and Responsibilities of Local,
State, and Federal Agencies: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Audwin M. Samuel, Councilmember and Mayorpro tern of Beaumont,
Texas), available at http://chs-republicans.house.gov/Files/Hearing/Testimony/Testimony
Samuel_0.doc.
241 See TOWNSEND, supra note 97.
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does not suggest that hazard mitigation has a role to play in reducing the
effects of future storms .12 Even a report from the Select Bipartisan Commit-
tee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
creatively entitledA Failure ofInitiative, while not hesitating to criticize the
actions of the federal government surrounding the hurricane,' does not cry
out for the implementation of effective hazard mitigation programs.2"
Waivers of federal environmental regulations in the wake of nat-
ural disasters such as hurricanes open the door for response, recovery, and
reconstruction efforts that pay little attention to impacts on the natural
environment.245 The coastal wetlands of the gulf coast play an important
role not only in the region's economy, but also in slowing down incoming
hurricanes and mitigating the damage that they cause to people and prop-
erty in the surrounding areas.246 The experience of Hurricane Katrina
demonstrates the disastrous consequences that wetlands loss and environ-
mentally careless response activities have on a region's population and
natural environment as well as the focus of federal government officials
on these immediate response activities at the expense of long-term avoid-
ance of future devastation.247 Despite political barriers to its implementa-
tion and widespread use, mitigation plays an essential role in disrupting
the cycle of property damage from natural disasters such as hurricanes.2' s
Our federal government must behave "in a way that reduces the risk of
flooding and hurricanes in the future, and the human suffering that fol-
lows."249 This cannot be done without increased attention to the effects
242 Id.
242 See SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE (2006). The first sentence of the
"Executive Summary of Findings" opens: "The Select Committee identified failures at all
levels of government that significantly undermined and detracted from the heroic efforts
of first responders, private individuals and organizations, faith-based groups, and
others." Id. at 1.
244 See id.
241 See supra Part I.
241 See supra Part II.
241 See supra Part III.
21 See supra Part IV.
24 Statement of Rod Emmer, supra note 199, at 2. Several authors have expressed the
opinion that a forward-looking response program is necessary, as opposed to the current
model which predominantly addresses disasters after they occur. Mary Comerio discussed
the financial implications of each strategy:
The frequency and intensity of disasters since 1989 reopens the question
of how society organizes disaster response and pays for recovery assis-
tance. We cannot continue under the present model. Insurers are no
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of federal disaster response programs and policies on delicate environ-
ments. Ideally, disaster response would not only restore people and
property to their pre-disaster status, but address any damage sustained
by the natural environment at the same time. Such a program would
decrease disaster response costs over the long term and could reduce
damages beginning with the very next hurricane.
longer willing to provide affordable coverage for full replacement value
on every house in areas of high risk. They would rather leave the market
entirely. At the same time, government cannot take on the role of a full-
service disaster-recovery lender. Further growth of government spending
in disaster recovery raises the issue of whether there should be any
public assistance for private losses.
COMERIO, supra note 172, at 23. Rod Emmer addressed the issue of the fairness of the
Hurricane Katrina spending policies to taxpayers who chose to live in places that are not
hazard-prone:
All of us will contribute to the rebuilding of the Gulf Coast and the New
Orleans area, not only through our personal contributions but with our
tax dollars. Therefore, [not only must] there.., be an evaluation of how
we plan, mitigate, and respond to natural hazards in order to ensure
that the nation is not ignoring natural hazards while positioning to deal
with human-caused disasters and acts of terrorism. We must rebuild
in a way that reduces the risk of flooding and hurricanes in the future,
and the human suffering that follows.
Statement of Rod Emmer, supra note 199, at 2. Erik Olson, speaking on behalf of the
Natural Resources Defense Council, addressed the role that attention to the environment
has in the process of revising disaster planning and response:
We must adopt a major coastal wetland restoration program in the wake
of Katrina to build back what we ourselves destroyed. It is also critical
to ensure that flood control projects ordered by Congress and developed
by the Army Corps of Engineers are prioritized to protect population
centers and serve legitimate flood control purposes, not the call of pork-
barrel politics.
Statement of Erik D. Olson, supra note 99, at 9.
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